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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Nationwide Insurance Company

Plaintiff-Respondent/
vs.

Case No. 890563-CA

PEREIDOUN E. POURMIRZAIE,

(Priority No. 14b)

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OP APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction in this court is predicated upon Section 782-2(3)(j), U.C.A. (1953, as amended 1988).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal

from a verdict

in a civil trial

awarding the respondent actual and punitive damages on a claim of
fraud.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

The

lower

court

erred

in refusing

to grant a

mistrial.
2. The lower court erred in permitting the jury to award
punitive damages by a preponderance of the evidence.
3.

The lower court erred in awarding the respondent

attorney's fees.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC.
Rules 403, 404 and 406, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 39, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Section 78-18-1, U.C.A. (1953, as amended).
Section 78-27-56, U.C.A. (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case.

This was a civil action for

fraud in which the respondent sought damages for a false insurance
claim together with punitive damages.
b.

Course of proceedings.

The respondent's complaint

was filed on July 16, 1987 (R. 2).

A jury trial was held on

January 17 and 18, 1989.
c.

Disposition in the lower court.

The jury entered a

special verdict on January 18, 1989, finding that the defendant had
defrauded the plaintiff and awarding the plaintiff $29,150.00 in
compensatory damages and $10,000.00 in punitive damages (R. 115).
The Court subsequently entered judgment for those amounts plus
$12,155.00

in

interest,

$263.60

in

costs

and

$8,385.50

in

attorney's fees (R. 173-174).
d.

Statement of facts.

The facts necessary to decide

this case, including citations to the record, are contained in the
argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The references by the respondent to the appellant's

nationality, a purported effort on his part to pay someone to marry
him and unrelated, alleged criminal activity by him warranted a
mistrial.
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2.

The lower court should have instructed the jury that

punitive damages must be proven by clear and convincing evidence
rather than the preponderance standard.
3.

The lower court erred

in awarding

the respondent

attorney's fees for three reasons. Firstf the appellant was denied
his right to a jury trial on this issue.

Second, the Court failed

to find that the appellant's defense was in bad faith and without
merit, the necessary prerequisites for such an award.
if it can be concluded

Third, even

that the defense was in bad

meritless, the lower court failed

faith and

to apportion the fees sought

between those which were incurred by reason of the defense and
those which would have been incurred under any circumstances.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A
MISTRIAL.
The respondent's counsel told the jury in her opening
statement that in two years the appellant ". . .had set a record
for frequency

of claims, amount of claims and

the sequence of

claims, in that the car—he would add a car to the policy one week
and the next week make a claim on it.
claims," (Transcript, p. 7 ) .

These are fairly unusual

She went on to say that two months

after the car which is the subject of this action had been reported
stolen, ". . .we got a claim. . .that his BMW had been stolen.
after the BMW theft, we took a sworn statement from [him],w

So,

(Id.).

Later, when the appellant testified, the respondent's counsel asked
him if he had paid an American woman to marry him for citizenship
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purposes/ to which the appellant promptly objected (T. 17),. The
respondent attempted to ask another witness about other claims paid
to the appellant which were ". . .later found out to be untrue/1
(T. 119). The theory counsel argued for admission of these "other
claims" was predicated upon Rule 406, U.R.E. (T. 127).

Counsel

argued that the other claims would show a "routine or practice" of
filing false claims. No effort was then made to substantiate that
argument.

Finally, when the appellant recalled a witness for the

respondent, that witness volunteered that the appellant's name had
been found on documents linked to unrelated criminal activity (T.
167). The appellant twice moved for a mistrial on the basis of all
these statements (T. 125, 169). Each time the motion was denied.
The lower court erred in refusing to grant the motions.
"A mistrial should be granted only when it appears that justice
will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial
granted," Watkiss & Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah
1979).

The cumulative effect of the respondent's efforts was to

"thwart justice."
The appellant is an Iranian, not presently America's
favorite

ethnic

group.

Having

established

his

origin,

the

respondent then attempted to prove he had once paid a woman to
marry him so he could become a citizen four years before the events
giving rise to this case occurred.

The respondent,, by its counsel

and witnesses, attempted to portray the appellant as having the
most

suspicious

Insurance.

claims

history

in

the

annals

of

Nationwide

The respondent's primary witness took it upon himself
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to simply volunteer that the appellantfs name had been linked to
other perhaps similar criminal activity.

All of these statements

and testimony were inadmissible under Rules 403 and 404, U.R.E.f
as the Court below correctly ruled.

However, in refusing to grant

the mistrial motions, the Court chose to ignore the cumulative
effect of the respondent's actions.
The respondent managed to convey to the jury that an
Iranian had paid a woman to become a citizen; that he was the most
suspicious client in the history of a major insurance company; and
that he was involved
activity.

in unrelated, possibly similar

criminal

None of this had anything to do with the issues before

the jury who heard the trial, yet all of it could only prejudice
the jurors against the appellant.

Applying the principle of the

Watkiss & Faber case, it appears here that "justice was thwarted"
and the motion should have been granted.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY
TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY A PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE.
In the event that this Court concludes it was not error
to refuse to grant a mistrial, it should nevertheless reverse the
award of punitive damages.

The jury was instructed

that the

standard of proof in awarding punitive damages was preponderance
of the evidence (R. 108, 109). The special verdict form contained
the same language (R. 116).

The appellant contended that the

burden of proof was by clear and convincing evidence (T. 174). The
appellant's position states the correct standard.
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Oddly, no Utah case seems to have addressed this issue.
However, this Court has recognized

that "In order to recover

punitive damages, a party must prove conduct that is willful and
malicious or that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and disregard
omitted.)"

of, the rights of others.

(Citations

Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P. 2d 950, 967

(Utah App. 1989).

The Arizona Supreme Court, in Linthicum v.

Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P. 2d 675 (1986), directly confronted
the quantum of proof of such conduct as described in Arnica which
would be required before punitive damages could be awarded.
The Linthicum court wrote,
As this remedy is only to be awarded in
the most egregious of cases, where there is
reprehensible conduct combined with an evil
mind over and above that required for commission of a tort, we believe it is appropriate
to impose a more stringent standard of proof.
When punitive damages are loosely assessed,
they become onerous not only to defendants but
the public as a whole.
Additionally, its
deterrent impact is lessened. Therefore, while
a plaintiff may collect compensatory damages
upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence
of his injuries due to the tort of another, we
conclude that recovery of punitive damages
should be awardable only upon clear and
convincing evidence of the defendant's evil
mind. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A. 2d at 13621363. In making this distinction, we are not
alone. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Raymond, supra;
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442
N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982); Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980);
Or.Rev.Stat. §30.925 (1981); Minn.Stat.Ann.
§549.20 (1984); See also Colo.Rev.Stat. §1325-127(2) (1973) (proof beyond a reasonable
doubt); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for
Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69
Va.L.Rev. 269, 296-298 (1983) (recommending
such a higher standard). We hpld that the
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burden of proof for punitive damages
clear and convincing evidence,

is by

723 P.2d 675, 681.
It is to be noted that four months after the trial of
this action. Section
effect.

78-18-1, U.C.A.

That statute

expressly

(1953, as amended),

states that proof of punitive

damages shall be by clear and convincing

evidence.

should

and

adopt

the

spirit

took

of that

statute

the

This Court
reasoning

of

Linthicum by holding the burden of proof in this state for punitive
damages to be clear and convincing evidence.

To rule otherwise

would lead to the peculiar result of requiring a much higher burden
for proof of fraud than is required for the attendant, and severe,
punitive damages.
POINT III
THE
LOWER COURT
ERRED
IN
RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Again,

if

this

Court

rules

AWARDING
that

the

THE
denial

of

the

mistrial motions was correct, then it should nevertheless consider
whether it was error to award the respondent attorney's fees.

The

appellant contends it was error for any of three separate reasons.
A.

Denial of jury trial.

The respondent was awarded attorney's fees in the sum of
$8,385.50 (R. 174).
based

The award was not made by the jury but was

on a post-trial

affidavit

(R. 123-124).

The

respondent

argued that the appellant's counsel stipulated to such a procedure
(R. 156). The appellant's former counsel denied any such agreement
and argued that an award of fees was a jury question.

The lower
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court's award of fees without the participation of the jury was
improper.
It is not necessary for this Court to resolve whether it
was or was not agreed that fees could be awarded by the court
rather than the jury.
this case.

No such agreement appears in the record of

Rule 39(a)(1), U.R.C.P., provides in pertinent part

that after a jury is demanded, the ". . atrial of all issues so
demanded

shall be by jury, unless

(1) The

parties or

their

attorneys of tecord, by written stipulation filed with the court
or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the
record,

consent

jury. . . . "

to

trial

by

the

court

sitting

without

a

(Emphasis added.)

In the absence of an "oral stipulation. . .entered in the
record," this Court cannot assume the appellant waived his right
to a jury trial on the issue of fees.
B.

Failure to make appropriate findings.

In order to award fees under Section 78-27-56, "a trial
court must make findings that 1) the claim or claims were 'without
merit,' and 2) the party's conduct was lacking in good faith,"
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, supra, at 966.

The lower court

here made no such findings, nor does the judgment, drafted by the
respondent, contain them. Therefore, no such award should be made.
C.

Failure to apportion fees.

Section 78-27-56(1), U.C.A. (1953, as amended), permits
fees to be awarded only to the extent that the ". . .defense to the
action was without merit and in bad faith."

Here, the lower

9
courtfs judgment awards fees for the entire time that respondent
was

represented

by

counsel.

No

showing

was made

a§

to what

portion, if any, of the fee was necessitated by the purported bad
faith/meritless defense raised by the appellant.

Yet, that is the

only portion for which the statute permits recovery.
decision,

supra,

at

966, makes

clear

that

such

a

The Arnica
failure

is

reversible error.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant a new trial based upon the lower
court's failure to grant a mistrial.

If it chooses not to do so,

then the award of punitive damages should be reversed because the
jury was incorrectly instructed as to the burden of proof.

The

award of attorney's fees should be reversed for any of the reasons
stated above.
Dated this

^

day of June, 1990.

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to Joy
L. Sanders, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, on the
_ day of June, 1990.
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ADDENDUM 1

INSTRUCTION NO. [jo
In addition to compensatory damages, under certain circumstances the law permits the jury to award an injured party
punitive damages.

Punitive damages punish a wrongdoer and

serve as a warning to others not to engage in such conduct.
The jury may award a plaintiff punitive damages in this
case if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff has been damaged as a result of acts or omissions of
the defendant done either willfully or maliciously, or with
reckless indifference toward and disregard of that plaintiff's
rights.

An act or omission is done willfully if it is done

intentionally.

An act or a failure to act is "maliciously"

done if it is prompted or accompanied by ill will, spite, or
grudge.

"Recklessly" means wantonly, with indifference to

consequences.

If a person makes a representation without

knowing whether it is true or not, or makes it without regard
to its truth or falsity or to its possible consequences, he may
be found to have made the representation recklessly.

ADDENDUM 2

R U B B1ST5UCT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAH 1 8 1389
M.T^KEXipUNTY
By —

>fT

"

o*puty Cfcrk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NATIONWIDE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
-vsFEREIDOUN Eo POURMIRZAIE,

Civil No. C-87-04820

Defendant.

(Judge David S. Young)

We, the Jury in the above-entitled action, find as
follows:
1.

Did the defendant defraud plaintiff?
Yes
No

&
^

If you answered the foregoing question wyes,w the Court
will award plaintiff compensatory damages of $29,150.00 and
you may answer question no# 2.

If you answered the foregoing

question wno,M then do not answer question no. 2.

20

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that

defendant ought to be punished and that plaintiff is entitled
to punitive damages?

Yes

ft

No

/^

If you answered the foregoing question "yes," you may
answer question no. 3.
3o

What amount of punitive damages, if any, should be

awarded plaintiff?

$ 16 ooo DATED this

} jjf

day of January, 1989.
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By-

•."•era

RAYMOND M. BERRY, A0310
JOY L. SANDERS, A4138
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

av4lr^MM

NATIONWIDE INSURANCE
COMPANY,

O-^Vv-x
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT

Plaintiff,
-vsFEREIDOUN E. POURMIRZAIE,

Civil No. C-87-04820
(Judge David S. Young)

Defendant.

This case came on regularly for trial on January 17 and 18,
1989/

the Honorable David S. Young presiding.

The plaintiff was

represented by Joy L. Sanders of Snow, Christensen & Martineau;
the defendant was represented by Herschel Bullen of McDonald &
Bullen.

The Jury found on Special Verdict that defendant had

defrauded plaintiff.

The Court had previously instructed the

Jury that in the event they found that defendant had defrauded
plaintiff the Court would award plaintiff compensatory
damages of $29,150.00.

The Jury further found on the special

verdict by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant ought
to be punished and that plaintiff was entitled to punitive
damages in the amount of $10,000*00.
The parties had previously stipulated that the issue of
attorney's fees and interest would be reserved for the Court
after the Jury returned its verdict.

Plaintiff is entitled

to interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum from July 24,
1985, on the compensatory damages of $29,150.00, for a total
amount of interest of $12,155.00 as of January 23, 1989.
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements
filed herewith, the Court finds that the defendant must pay
costs in the amount of $2 63.60.
Pursuant to the Affidavit of Joy L. Sanders filed herewith,
the Court finds that the defendant must pay attorney's fees
in the amount of $8,385.50.
In summary, therefore, the Court finds that the plaintiff
is entitled to special damages in the amount of $29,150.00, plus
prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $12,155.00 as of
January 23, 1989, plus punitive damages of $10,000.00, plus
attorney's fees of $8,385.50, and costs of $263.60.
Now, therefore, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed
that:

-2-

JUDGMENT be, and hereby is, entered in favor of the
plaintiff, Nationwide Insurance Company, and against the
defendant, Fereidoun E. Pourmirzaie, in the sum of $59,954.10,
with interest thereon at the rate of 12 percent per annum
from the date hereof until paid.

DATED this

fl/tlLt 6-R

/3 ^ay of

David S. Young
District Coidxt iudc
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
MCDONALD & BULLEN

By.
Herschel Bullen
Attorneys for Defendant

•3-
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Cheryl A. Hunter, being first duly sworn, states that she is
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for
Plaintiff
herein, that she served the attached Proposed Judgment on
Special Verdict
in Civil No. C-87-04820
, Salt Lake Co. Third District Court
upon the following parties by placing a true and correct copy thereof
in an envelope addressed to:
HERSCHEL BULLEN
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on
the 2 4 t h day of
January
f/1989.
1

Corr.fPistion

<^

(^> lany^KQyM

Expires7--,'-32 O^UBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e tfni on t h i s
f!A L. GA,».:: r-gLLg
January
, 1 9 8 9 . ^ //I
SJJ'L.M CMV ^Sojmnission E x p i r e s :
ISK^//^L^SPC^
, ui 64m ,^/f
Notary P u b l i c

^s*
24th
^/3y

day o f

ADDENDUM 4

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 403

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Probability evidence.
Courts have routinely excluded probability
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical
conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence
before it and decide where truth lies. State v
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).

ANALYSIS

Discretion of court.
Effect of remoteness.
Irrelevant evidence.
Probability evidence.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Discretion of court.
The trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
Effect of remoteness.
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979).
Irrelevant evidence.
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another
participant in the crime had no bearing on defendant's guilt or innocence and was properly
excluded as not relevant to defendant's participation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667
P.2d 586 (Utah 1983).

Scientific evidence.
The Frye test (that scientific tests still in the
experimental stages should not be admitted in
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced
from a well recognized scientific principle or
discovery is admissible if the scientific principle is sufficiently established) is a valid test,
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for
determining when scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted and is not inconsistent with Rules 402, 403, and 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. Kofford v. Flora, 744
P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987).
Standard of review.
The judgment of the trial court admitting or
excluding evidence will not be reversed unless
it is shown that the discretion exercised
therein has been abused. Terry v. Zions Coop.
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — United States v.
Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the
Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839.
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA
Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.
A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evaluation test results or of statements made during
test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202.
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior
misidentification of accused in connection with
commission of crime similar to that presently
charged, 50 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Products liability: admissibility of evidence

of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th
1186.
Thermographic tests: admissibility of test results in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th
1105.
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143.
Products liability: admissibility of experimental or test evidence to disprove defect in
motor vehicle, 64 A.L.R.4th 125.
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary bloodstains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588.

Rule 403, Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as

a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402.
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ADDENDUM 5

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
A.L.R. — Noncharacter witnesses in civil
case, limiting number of, 5 A.L.R.3d 169.
Noncharacter witnesses in criminal case,
limiting number of, 5 A.L.R.3d 238.
Character or reputation witnesses, propriety
and prejudicial effect of trial court's limiting
number of, 17 A.L.R.3d 327.

Rule 404

Evidence offered by defendant at federal
criminal trial as inadmissible, under Rule 403
of Federal Rules of Evidence, on ground that
probative value is substantially outweighed by
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
or misleading the jury, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 700.
Key Numbers. — Evidence «=» 143.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Provisions of this
rule apply to character evidence to prove conduct, as distinguished from proof of character
where character is an essential element of a
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was
comparable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d
703 (Utah 1977) (character evidence as to the
character of the victim of a homicide was admissible to rebut the defendant's contention
that the deceased was the aggressor). One significant difference between this rule and Rule
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there
is no provision for the use of character evidence
in civil cases, except where character is the
ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47

authorized the use of character evidence in
civil cases not only on the ultimate issue but
where otherwise substantively relevant. See
Boyce, Character Evidence: The Substantive
Use, 4 Utah Bar J. 13, 18-19 (1976). However,
Rule 48, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly excluded character evidence with respect to a trait as to care or skill. The Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence
concluded that the remaining justification for
the admission of character evidence was so insignificant that character evidence in civil
cases should not be admitted unless it was in
issue.
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55,
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce,
Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5
Utah Bar J. 31 (1977).

553

ADDENDUM 6

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Bight preserved.
—Appeal from industrial commission.
This trial rule is not applicable to trial de
novo in the district court on appeal from industrial commission's decision on a sex discrimination in employment case. Beehive Medical
Elecs., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53
(Utah 1978).
—Court's discretion.
In circumstances where doubt exists as to
whether a cause should be regarded as one in
equity or one in law, wherein the party can
insist on a jury as a matter of right, the trial
court should have some discretion and may examine the nature of the rights asserted and the

Rule 39

remedies sought in the light of the facts of the
case to ascertain which predominates and,
from that determination, make the appropriate
order as to a jury or nonjury trial. Corbet v.
Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P.2d 1318 (1974).
Waiver.
—Failure to make written demand.
Failure to make a written demand for a jury
trial upon the opposing party waives any error
in a court's failure to grant a jury trial. Gasser
v. Home, 557 P.2d 154 (Utah 1976).
Cited in Stickle v. Union Pac. R.R., 122
Utah 477, 251 P.2d 867 (1952); Best v. Huber,
3 Utah 2d 177, 281 P.2d 208 (1955); Hansen v.
Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 10,
57 to 69, 71, 81, 82, 84 to 89.
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 10, 84 to 113.
A.L.R. — Obtaining jury trial in eminent
domain; waiver, 12 A.L.R.3d 7.
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321.
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393.
Statute reducing number of jurors as violative of right to trial by jury, 47 A.L.R.3d 895.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties. 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Right to jury trial in stockholder's derivative
action, 32 A.L.R.4th 1111.
Right to jury trial in action for declaratory
relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th 146.

Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51
A.L.R.4th 565.
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory
discharge from employment, 52 A.L.R.4th
1141.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Validity of law or rule requiring state court
party who requests jury trial in civil case to
pay costs associated with jury, 68 A.L.R.4th
343.
Rule 38 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedurewaived right to jury trial as revived by
amended or supplemental pleadings, 18 A.L.R.
Fed. 754.
Key Numbers, — Jury <&=> 10, 25 to 28.

Rule 39, Trial by jury or by the court,
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38,
the action shall be designated upon the register of actions as a jury action. The
trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed
with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in
the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury, or
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of
trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist, or
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial.
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule
38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to
demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of
right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any
or all issues.
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not triable of right
by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with
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an advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a
jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of
right.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 39, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Trial by court

ANALYSIS

Advisory jury.
—Equity.
Trial by consent.
—Equity.
Motion for directed verdict.
Trial by court.
—Waiver of court trial.
—Waiver of jury trial.
Trial by jury.
—Grant of jury trial.
——Absence of demand.
—Right.
——Quiet title action.
Cited.
Advisory jury.
—Equity.
When there is a demand for a jury trial in an
equity case, the jury will serve only in an advisory capacity unless both parties have clearly
consented to accept a jury verdict. Romrell v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah
1980).
Trial court did not commit prejudicial error
by allowing a jury to sit in an equity proceeding where the jury was retained merely as an
advisory jury to consider the sole question of
the reasonableness of plaintiffs reliance on defendant's act. Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984).
Trial by consent
—Equity.
Motion for directed verdict.
Where the case was essentially one in equity
but the parties and court appeared to have consented to presenting their case to a jury whose
verdict would have "the same effect as if trial
by jury had been a matter of right," under Subdivision (c), the determination of whether a directed verdict was proper was to be tested by
the same rules governing cases at law. Willard
v. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607 (Utah
1978).

—Waiver of court trial.
Even though former statute providing for
trial by court in absence of demand for jury
was couched in mandatory terms, and a party
might have an absolute right to have the issues tried by the court, the right could be
waived, as by proceeding to trial before a jury.
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 47
Utah 215, 152 P. 726 (1915).
—Waiver of jury trial.
Where it did not appear that any demand for
a jury trial was made, or that any objection or
exception was made at any time during trial
against right of the court to try the case without a jury, it would be presumed on appeal that
a trial by jury was waived. Perego v. Dodge, 9
Utah 3,33 P. 221 (1893), aff d, 163 U.S 160,16
S. Ct. 971, 41 L. Ed. 113 (1896).
Trial by jury.
—Grant of jury trial.
Absence of demand.
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting
jury trial to defendant, under this rule, over
plaintiffs objections although defendant had
not made proper demand for jury trial under
Rule 38, where plaintiff was not prejudiced
thereby. James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964).
—Right
Quiet title action.
This rule gives the right to have any legal
issue of fact tried by a jury upon proper demand, and plaintiff in an action to quiet title to
mining claims was entitled to a jury trial on
issues of fact. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11,
327 P.2d 250 (1958).
Cited in Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co.,
6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956).
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78-18-1

JUDICIAL CODE

CHAPTER 18
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
Section
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards
— Section inapplicable to DUI
cases — Division of award with
state.

Section
78-18-2. Drug exception.

78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of award with
state.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of
Subsection (a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out
of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and
drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made.
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of
the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into
the General Fund.
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 237, § 1.
Applicability. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4
provides that the act applies to all claims for

punitive damages that arise on or after May 1,
1989.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4
makes the act effective on May 1, 1989.

78-18-2. Drug exception.
(1) Punitive damages may not be awarded if a drug causing the claimant's
harm:
(a) received premarket approval or licensure by the Federal Food and
Drug Administration under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. Section 301 et seq. or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
Section 201 et seq.;
(b) is generally recognized as safe and effective under conditions established by the Federal Food and Drug Administration and applicable regulations, including packaging and labeling regulations.
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78-27-51

JUDICIAL CODE

History: L. 1977, ch. 143, § 1; 1989, ch.
241, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 1,1989, added the subsec-

tion designations, added Subsection (2Kb), substituted "section" for "act" in Subsection (3),
and made stylistic changes.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Credit card issuer's liability, under state laws, for wrongful billing, cancellation, dishonor, or disclosure, 53 A.L.R.4th 231.

78-27-51. Inherent risks of skiing — Public policy.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Ski resort's liability for skier's injuries resulting from condition of ski run or
slope, 55 A.L.R.4th 632.

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except
under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not
otherwise provided by statute or agreement"

following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); substituted "shall" for "may" following "the court"
in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsection (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added
Subsection (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
in good faith. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1989).

ANALYSIS

Findings.
Cited.
Findings.
Under this section, a trial court must make
findings that: (1) the claim or claims were
"without merit," and (2) the party did not act

Cited in Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101
(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d
1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush,
744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v.
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d
60 (Utah 1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 102
Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. App. 1989).
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